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This little book was written during the final year of MaryMidgley’s life. It was pub-
lished the week of her ninety-ninth birthday and one month before her death.
Midgley tells us that she wasmotivated to write it by “a rather general exasperation
against the whole reductive, scientistic, mechanistic, fantasy-ridden creed which
still constantly distorts the world-view of our age” (190). Her book is beautifully
clear, free from jargon, and brimming with wit and wisdom. The exasperation
that motivated it gives the prose sharp edges and lively pace. I will be giving this
book to any aunts, friends, or neighbors who ask me what it is I do and why it mat-
ters. I would also set this for first-year undergraduates and A-level students. In it
they will find the materials they need to articulate a defense of their chosen sub-
ject. They will discover an inspirational and ambitious description of how to use
the tools that their philosophical education gives them to make their lives as in-
dividuals, and our lives together, better. They will also find that uncommongem: a
style of philosophical prose to admire and mimic.
In the course of articulating a defense of philosophy, and of the arts and hu-
manities more broadly, Midgley also bequeaths us a sharp critique of contempo-
rary academic culture and of the way that universities are administrated and funded.
This critique is all the more valuable and poignant coming from someone who
started her university education almost a decade before women could take de-
grees at Cambridge, whose husband (Geoffrey Midgley) was part of Ryle’s army
of analytic philosophers (installed in provincial departments to evangelize for
the new analytic method), whose department at Newcastle University was closed
under Thatcher’s government, andwho saw inher retirement the introduction in
the United Kingdom of research councils, tuition fees, the Research Excellence
Framework, and the impact agenda.
Midgley perceives the “mechanistic creed” that is the target of this book as a
driving force behind our climate emergency (187), as operative in our difficulties
in understanding and properly valuing mental health (30, 194–95), and as at the
root of our troubles with the concept of toleration (65–67). She traces its source
back to the Enlightenment and to the stories, myths, and visions that philoso-
phers, scientists, and poets created to fit the new science and its remarkable find-
ings into a workable worldview. As Midgley sees it, those stories and myths have
become distorted and have outgrown their use. The visions and beliefs they gen-
erated have become too dominant. Now, rather than forming a basis on which sci-
entific inquiry can find its proper and proportionate place in human life, they are
preventing us from seeing what is before our eyes and from acting well in the face
of that reality.For permission to reuse, please contact journalpermissions@press.uchicago.edu.
19437.proof.3d 1 09/26/19 22:08Achorn International
1
q4
2 Ethics January 2020Midgley has elsewhere written extensively about the impact of a “mechanistic
creed” on our capacity to understand and respond to the natural world and to
each other (e.g., Mary Midgley, Utopias, Dolphins and Computers: Problems of Philo-
sophical Plumbing [New York: Routledge, 1996]; and The Myths We Live By [New
York: Routledge, 2003]). She wants us to be able to view our environment and
the animals with whom we share it (human and nonhuman) through the lens of
contemporary scientific understanding—to base our responses and actions on ev-
idence and expertise, and to utilize technology where it helps. But she thinks that
we must do so while recognizing that the very same world can be viewed through
the eyes of the poets, artists, and historians. And she wants us to feel neither pan-
icked by nor complacent about the apparent clashes between these perspectives.
For Midgley, different ways of seeing and describing a single reality reflect differ-
ent but important aspects of the culture of human animals, an ever-changing cul-
ture rooted in nature but also in our history and—importantly for Midgley—in
the clashes, arguments, and battles for authority that are part of that history. “Cul-
ture,” Midgley reminds us (crediting her friend Iris Murdoch), is “not just a mat-
ter of a few recent films and fashions” but “contains everything that we believe in,
including our fashionable views about science itself” (54). And what we believe
most deeply and unreflectively is often a legacy of a previous, sometimes forgot-
ten battle for cultural, political, or religious dominance between rival authorities.
Our task as philosophers is to reflect on the different parts of human life and
language—different ways of seeing and describing our world and the beliefs that
underpin each—and to understand how and whether they fit together. Philoso-
phers need to identify clashes between different areas of thought and to uncover
tensions that are disrupting our ability to see clearly and to act well. They need to
tell us when certain parts of our culture—and so our lives—are becoming domi-
nant to the extent that they are leading us to neglect others or when they are forc-
ing themselves into areas of human life where they do not belong. Philosophers
need to speak up when, for example, “fashionable views about science” are pre-
venting us from saying the things we need to say about moral responsibility or
the environment. The philosopher’s task will often require her to trace concepts
and the beliefs that go with them backward to the point in our past where they
emerged and then to look at the historical and philosophical context of that ini-
tial innovation. For this reason, Midgley insists that philosophers need to take a
sharp interest in contemporary culture while cultivating a deep and humane
knowledge of history and the history of philosophy—this is the point with which
Midgley opens her book (7). Philosophers also need to be able to innovate—to
find new words and visions and articulate new beliefs that resolve clashes and re-
balance our lives. This is why, as Midgley reiterates in this book, philosophers
need to have poetic as well as analytic skills (see alsoMaryMidgley, “Philosophical
Plumbing,” Philosophy 33 [1992]: 139–51]). This is part of the attraction, for
Midgley, of the Gaia hypothesis (see, e.g., Mary Midgley, Science and Poetry [New
York: Routledge 2003]).
Often at the root of a problem,Midgley tells us, is the question, “Who should
I put my trust in?” (99). Our “fashionable views about science” give rise to an an-
swer that dominates our age: “Always and only trust Science—never Religion, His-
tory, or Philosophy.”Midgley argues that this answer is as bad for the scientist as it19437.proof.3d 2 09/26/19 22:08Achorn International
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back to later.
Midgley—in this book as in her others—wants to return us (as philosophers
and as a society) to the sanity and common sense that she thinks wemight achieve
if we escape the fantasy that is the “mechanistic creed.” Her view is that philos-
ophy’s role is to help us to think and act in the light of a clear-eyed realism about
human life and our place in the world, something it does by articulating a coher-
ent worldview. This is her way of interpreting the Socratic directive to live an ex-
amined life (11). Right now, argues Midgley, our worldview is not coherent but
rather is dangerously disordered, and professional philosophy, insofar as it has
bought into the “mechanistic creed” that has come to dominate our culture, is
asleep at the wheel.
Unless we have Midgley’s firm grasp of the depth and difficultly of the work
that is required to achieve this sort of sanity—to let go of the “mechanistic
creed”—her call for common sense can appear naive, her ambitions for philoso-
phy upsettingly modest, and her appreciation and representation of scientific
practice willfully misleading. Midgley is a philosopher who has sometimes been
dismissed by those who work in the academy on such grounds. One of the things
that this book is keen to display and explain is the enormous difficulty—intellec-
tual but also psychological, imaginative, emotional, historical, and cultural—of
achieving this sort of sane realism. This, I conjecture, is a lesson she drew out of
her close engagement withWittgenstein in the early 1950s. Another focus of Mid-
gley’s book is the nature of the “mechanistic creed” andhow it is that we can simul-
taneously recognize it as a fantasy—a grossmisrepresentation of scientific practice—
and be as a culture utterly in its thrall. To understand this is to grasp something
very deep about human nature and about the power of philosophy. Iris Murdoch
is another philosopher who grasped this and who, as a result, wrote extensively
about the ethical significance of fantasy and imagination.
One aim in this review is to address the misconception that Midgley is a su-
perficial or simplistic thinker. This book, for all its pace and wit, is not journalistic.
It is a carefully structured and impeccably argued piece ofmetaphysics and ethics,
one that draws deeply on the history of philosophy and uses specialist philosoph-
ical tools. It is underpinned by unified and unifying theories of human nature,
mind, and language (for her fullest presentation of these, seeMaryMidgley, Beast
andMan: The Roots of HumanNature [New York: Routledge, 1978]). It deploys these
tools with so light a touch that a reader may fail to notice them at work and un-
derlying theories play their role without appearing on the surface of the text as
scaffolding, appeals to authority, or extraneous labeling.Midgley was alreadymas-
ter of her craft and at ease in her metaphysical system before she published her
first book at age fifty-nine. The simplicity and joy with which she writes reflect the
fact that she is at home in her own thought system, and this has masked from
some the philosophical sophistication of her work.
The book is divided into four parts: “The Search for Signposts,” “Tempting
Visions of Science,” “Mindlessness andMachineWorship,” and “Singularities and
the Cosmos.” Were it composed only of the first two, it would be far less interest-
ing than it is. The charge of “popular philosophy”might bemade to stick, and the
reader could fairly judge that there was little in it not to be found elsewhere, and19437.proof.3d 3 09/26/19 22:08Achorn International
4 Ethics January 2020with more detail, in other parts of Midgley’s corpus. But it is the way in which the
groundwork in those parts meshes with the philosophical work done in parts 3
and 4 that makes this little book worthy of attention from professional philoso-
phers, and it is in these later parts that we see Midgley covering new ground.
In parts 1 and 2, Midgley sets out her understanding of the object of philo-
sophical thought. She begins with a contrast between scientific and philosophical
thinking. The aim of specialist sciences like crystallography or ornithology, she
writes, is to “spiral inward and down toward particular parts of truth” (71). Their
particular object of inquiry is fixed and given—crystalline solids or birds—and
their aim is to understand that object in greater and greater detail. Our joy in this
sort of inquiry comes partly from a fascination with our own capacity to measure
our world precisely, an occupation that Midgley reminds us is “quite a new phe-
nomenon, invented recently in our culture.” This relative newness will later take
on significance in her argument: “We are not, after all, animals whose whole evo-
lutionary history has centred on becoming able to measure the world precisely”
(44). Thinking of this kind is properly called “research” because it involves, in
Midgley’s words, “a static mining operation” (17). There is a clearly defined search
area to be reworked, measured, and understood more deeply or in greater detail.
This is not to say that surprise discoveries may not be made in these fields, or that
those discoveries might not utterly transform our understanding of their object,
but only that the sort of thinking that constitutes “scientific research” is on the
whole about getting a deeper and more detailed understanding of a well-defined
subject area—returning more accurate and precise measurements of roughly un-
derstood phenomena.
It is a fact about human nature that we take pleasure in this sort of drilling-
down activity, that we enjoy uncovering obscure or concealed features of our
world through obsessive focus on one tiny part of everything that calls for our at-
tention. It speaks, Midgley conjectures, to a much more ancient set of instincts
and interests, ones that our brains have indeed evolved to center—the brain’s left
hemisphere specializes in “obsessive, specialised interest” (15) and “diving into
the smaller details” (28). But as a species our overarching motivation in pursuing
scientific research is instrumental. Through this kind of thinking we have made
enormous progress not just in our understanding of the world but also in our
technology. We have been able to construct machinery that can perform many
jobs that past humanshad todobyhand:we canusemachines toperform inmicro-
seconds calculations that would have been laborious and time-consuming for our
grandparents or to convey us from London to Edinburgh in a matter of hours
rather than days. And in addition to becoming more efficient, we have also built
machines that allow us to do things that were previously impossible for creatures
of our kind. We can fly, something barely conceivable a few generations ago; we
can seemicroscopic objects, grow new organs, and speak in real time to people on
the other side of the globe.
What then of philosophical thinking? For Midgley philosophical thinking is
not a “new phenomenon”—a recent addition to human culture—but an activity
that has been a central part of human culture from its beginning. It is thinking
that aims, as we have seen, at making connections between different areas of our
lives and thought in order to construct a “coherent world picture.” In this sense,
specialist scientific research faces in the opposite direction to philosophical thinking.19437.proof.3d 4 09/26/19 22:08Achorn International
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outward, always looking for helpful connections—new patterns of thinking and
living that explain the ways in which we think and live now” (72). When we ask
“where [our current world pictures] came from we shall probably find that they
have been shaped by earlier philosophers who influenced our tradition” (73). This
is why the philosopher must know the history of philosophy (and the history of sci-
ence), while the crystallographer need not know the history of crystallography.
The difficulty of finding connections and new patterns of thinking and liv-
ing is the difficulty of philosophy and also the difficulty of taking a sane and real-
istic stance. In our modern lives, the difficulty is connected to the fact that there
exist a vast array of specialist sciences and so-called academic disciplines, each of
which has its own history, terminology, and scholarly journals. These disciplines
often generate descriptions of our world that are, on the surface at least, incon-
sistent either with each other or with our more everyday understanding of the
world and each other. These inconsistencies may go unnoticed if they concern
arenas that do not immediately impact our day-to-day lives, but when we learn
from the neuroscientist that moral responsibility is a myth, or from the economist
that self-interested individuals benefit society, we are forced to attend to the
disconnect.
But though our modern problem is exacerbated by this divergence of spe-
cialisms—a divergence itself exacerbated by contemporary universities’ focus on
“research”—it would be a serious mistake to take this modern manifestation of
our problem for the problem itself, as if the difficulty of constructing a coherent
worldview emerges only with the distinction between biology and genetics, soci-
ology and psychiatry. Rather, the tensions, gaps, and contradictions in our world-
view are internal to the human form of life, to a life shaped by culture. Practical
and conceptual problems arise from the conflict between our first-person expe-
rience of our own existence as temporally unbounded and our understanding of
ourselves as mortal creatures; from the need to reconcile different species of
causal explanation (e.g., teleological and efficient); from our knowledge that we
are at once fully responsible for our actions and beings who are predictably shaped
by our upbringing, our experiences, and local customs; and from the fact that jus-
tice may demand what friendship prohibits. No specialist knowledge is needed to
generate these clashes in worldview.
Midgley’s contention is that as universities have embraced the notion of “re-
search,” and with it the associated model of specialist thinking, philosophy has
made the mistake of falling in line and rebranding itself as a kind of specialist re-
search, one with a fixed area of inquiry and the promise of fact-finding, progress
through specialist knowledge and drilling down. David Chalmers (47) andDaniel
Dennett (101) provide her foils here, but Midgley’s target is quite general. To the
extent that we philosophers have accepted the characterization of our work as “re-
search” and its aim as “progress,” we too have fallen in line. One symptom of the
widespread acceptance of this paradigm is a general lack of interest in the history
of our own discipline (2–13). But for Midgley this rebranding is disastrous and
leaves professional philosophy exposed. Philosophical thinking is not designed
to do the job of a specialist science—a philosopher will inevitably fail to deliver
“research findings” that can compete with those of the crystallographer because,
unlike the crystallographer, the philosopher does not have a small, well-defined19437.proof.3d 5 09/26/19 22:08Achorn International
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range across thewholeof human life. She cannot takeher subjectmatter for granted
because a large part of her work is to identify what her subjectmatter is. She needs
to look outward, to take in everything that calls her attention and not be drawn in
by some tiny part of the whole. Again,Wittgenstein’s influence is visible here. The
philosopher’s inevitable failure to give answers and discover facts that pass mus-
ter as “research findings” leaves the discipline vulnerable to the sort of thinking
that led to Midgley’s department at Newcastle University being closed in the
1980s, along with metallurgy—another research specialism that was presumably
failing to deliver the goods (9).
“Philosophy,” writesMidgley, “is not just one specialized subject amongmany,
something which you only need to study if you mean to do research on it. Instead,
it is something we are all doing all the time, a continuous, necessary background
activity which is likely to go badly if we don’t attend to it. In this way, it is perhaps
more like driving a car or using money than it is like nuclear physics” (81). The
“background activity” that has been the province of past philosophers will, of course,
go on happening without us: it is “not a private luxury [but] something we all
need for our lives” (73). There is no option for individuals to stop trying to make
sense of things, nor any place from which to avoid the conflicts and tensions that
arise when different ways of looking at our world come into contact. With philos-
ophers otherwise occupied, the task of making sense of our world remains, so the
result of our (philosophers’) abdication is not that people stop trying to build a
coherent worldview, but that they build bad ones; worldviews that are overly sim-
plistic and primitive and rely on childish imagery—battles, animals, or a parental
authority—will be likely to triumph (177). Propagandists know this well: the War
on Terror, the Nanny State, and Taking Back Control are recent examples.
So far we have spoken of the specialist sciences as “drilling down.” But Mid-
gley argues that in the absence of a coherent worldview, and with philosophy oth-
erwise occupied, the myths and stories that Enlightenment thinkers told to fit
the new science into a worldview that was workable for them—myths and stories
created in the context of a deadly battle between secular and religious authority—
have begun to exercise greater and greater control over our imaginations. It is
now unexceptional to think that while the aims of the specialist sciences are, nat-
urally, limited, the “aim of Science as a whole” is boundless—that the sum total of
scientific knowledge will be the sum total of knowledge simpliciter. It is true, Mid-
gley writes, that if we are to give sense to the question “What is the aim of Science
as a whole?” the answer would “have to be something very general,” something
like “the sum of all the particular truths, along with the relations between them”
(72). But this ought not to lead us to embrace the myth of scientism. For while
science “as a whole” may aim at the “sum of all the particular truths,” the “partic-
ular truths” that are the business of science make up a world seen from just one
angle: namely, the objective, disinterested stance of a creature occupied in the busi-
ness of measuring, examining, drilling down into one particular area. The claim
that the sum of scientific truths is “The Truth” is one that Midgley thinks we should
hear first and foremost as a claim of authority, one that is meant to settle the pres-
tige question: “which is the top discipline, science or some part of the Humanities”
(88). Such a question is, Midgley thinks, as misguided as the question “Who is19437.proof.3d 6 09/26/19 22:08Achorn International
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knife?” (142). The answer to all these questions depends on what it is you are trying
to do.
This brings us to the pivot of What Is Philosophy For?—where Midgley moves
beyond “familiar history” and onto new ground: “What I want to say next, how-
ever, is less familiar: I want to point out that the idea of physical science has itself
a strong and effective symbolism. . . . It is now the central example of a compulsory
doctrine, something that has to be believed. It is an oracle. And this status has dis-
turbing effects on the way we now think about science itself” (85). The word ‘or-
acle’ is carefully chosen here by a philosopher who studied classics. “When hu-
man beings get lost their commonest response is to look for an oracle—an
agency that will take the next decision for them” (123). In ancient myth an oracle
is a priest of medium through whom the gods speak, and to whom “bewildered”
mortals go seeking prophesy and direction (122). Midgley, in introducing the im-
age, reminds us, too, of the traditional dangers of trusting one’s fate to an oracle,
and of the need for care in interpreting the message: “Croesus, king of Lydia,
asked theDelphic oracle whetherhe should attack the Persians, and was told that,
if he did, he would destroy a great empire. (That was, of course, correct, only the
empire was his own.)” (125). With philosophers occupied with “research,” and
with the gods no longer an option, one might imagine that the oracle of which
Midgley speaks is the scientist—that her thought is that the resting place for sci-
entism is the deification of the scientist, or at least of science. But Midgley pres-
ents us with a much more frightening vision. Our culture’s oracle, she proposes,
is not the human scientist but the machine itself. Science won the power struggle
with the humanities, but the victory has proved Pyrrhic, as the disinterested search
for truth has morphed into “the cult of impersonality” (159). This is the topic of
parts 3 and 4.
In “Mindlessness and Machine Worship” and “Singularity and the Cosmos”
Midgley describes some of the fantasies about “cleverness,” “intelligence,” and
“knowledge” that scientism has primed us to accept. Absent in its worldview is
the perspective fromwhich Shakespeare, Socrates, Bach, orMother Theresamight
be judged intelligent—much less that from which a dolphin or octopus might be
thought so—and instead we are offered a flattened-out, linear, quantifiable image
of intelligence, one that is also captured in the notion that we might arrange our-
selves in order of intelligence based on the results of IQ tests (141). From this per-
spective it is perfectly sensible to say, “Alan Turing is more intelligent than Frida
Kahlo,” “This computer is more intelligent than a human,” or “Soon human intel-
ligence will be outrun by machine intelligence.” Or, it might be sensible to take
literally the phrase “artificial intelligence.” Scientism is a myth that primes us to
replace the sane observation that intelligence is “a general term like ‘usefulness’
or ‘rarity’” with the “hopelessly unreal” idea that “‘intelligence’ . . . names a sin-
gle measurable property, like ‘temperature’ or ‘weight’” (142).
The idea of artificial intelligence, in contemporary culture, terminates in
the notion of the “Singularity”—a moment at which machine intelligence so out-
strips human intelligence that reality is forever beyond human ken. This idea is
incoherent, thinks Midgley, based as it is on that unreal conception of intelli-
gence, and it may seem below a philosopher to “waste time discussing such wild19437.proof.3d 7 09/26/19 22:08Achorn International
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discussed—the intellectual and emotional character of that conversation—re-
flects a deepmalaise in our culture, one that does call for our attention, connected
as it is to the genuinely existential threat we currently face from climate change.
She begins by observing that the terror that one would expect in those who believe
that the Singularity is coming is strangely absent: “the most surprising thing about
these manifestos is surely their welcoming and reverent tone” (145). This absence
of terror for her signifies the way in which this image, andmore broadly the idea of
“artificial intelligence,” is now fulfilling a psychological and emotional need that
should be being served by philosophy. In the absence of a coherent worldview,
in a state of “bewilderment,” the idea of abdicating responsibility—intellectual
and ethical—for our futures and placing it in the hands of an oracle is great. We
can stop paying attention, stop trying to figure it out, because greater artificial in-
telligences are doing it for us. Themythic idea that we are no longer smart enough
to make decisions, to take control of our future, to figure out what to do next—
about climate, war, environment, or education—is a comforting sedative but is ul-
timately suicidal. If it was foolish and risky to trust in the words of a divine oracle, to
trust instead those of an imagined future inanimate mechanism is certainly no im-
provement. “If this is right, I suspect that . . . philosophical reasoning will now be-
come rather important. We shall need to think how best to think about [our fu-
ture]. And if we don’t do that for ourselves, it’s hard to see who will be able to
do it for us” (208). This is an ambitious and humbling prophesy but seems to me
to be a timely wakeup call for those of us who call ourselves philosophers.
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QUERIES TO THE AUTHOR
Q1.Au: Your article has been edited for grammar, clarity, consistency, and con-
formity to journal style. Please read the article to make sure that your meaning
has been retained. Note that we may be unable to make revisions that conﬂict
with journal style or create grammatical problems. Thank you.
Q2. Au: please double-check usage of various styles throughout the article to
ensure that they are in accord with journal style as follows: (1) italics are al-
lowed primarily for initial mention of key terms; (2) single quotations should
be used only for “mention quotes” (i.e., when mentioning a word rather than
using it); (3) double quotations should be used for (a) quotations from other
works, (b) scare quotes, or (c) when deﬁning a term/expression for particular
use in an article.
Q3. Au: expansion of “REF” correct here? If not, please clarify.
Q4. Au: correct to remove the em dash before “that resolve . . . ” (to avoid
the construction “to innovate . . . that resolve”)? If not, please clarify sentence
structure.
Q5. Au: correct to change “by those of who work” to “by those who work”? If
not, please clarify.
Q6. Au: block quotations must be a minimum of 100 words (with the exception
of theorems, propositions, deﬁnitions, etc.), per journal style.
Q7. Au: correct to change “her thought is that resting place” to “her thought is
that the resting place”? If not, please clarify.19437.proof.3d 9 09/26/19 22:08Achorn International
